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6.1  Introduction 
In the United States in 1992, there were four million elderly adults who were 
officially classified as poor. There were 3  1 million elderly in the United States 
in 1992, so that the poverty rate was just under 13 percent. Children were much 
more likely to be poor than the elderly; 22 percent,  or 1.5  million children, 
were poor. This paper is about where such numbers come from and what (if 
anything) they mean. The data used to make the official calculations do not 
tell us anything about individual poverty. Instead they provide information on 
the income of families, information that is used to construct a set of  poverty 
counts about  individuals.  The transformation  from families to individuals 
makes many assumptions, about the allocation of resources within the house- 
hold, about the differential needs of children, adults, and the elderly, and about 
the extent of economies of scale. Given the data, the effect of these assump- 
tions on the poverty count depends on living arrangements,  on how people 
combine  to form families, on whether  people  are married  or cohabit,  on 
whether the elderly live by themselves or with other, younger adults. 
In this paper we examine how living arrangements affect poverty measure- 
ment among the elderly in the United States, highlighting the importance of 
living arrangements. In the United States in 1992, 32 percent of those aged 6.5 
or over lived alone, a further 42 percent lived in all-elderly families, and 26 
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percent  lived  in  families  with  at  least  one nonelderly  person.  Conclusions 
about  the  living  standards  of  the  elderly-absolute  or relative-are  deter- 
mined not only by the data but also by assumptions about who gets what and 
how poverty lines vary with household composition. We demonstrate this fact 
by calculating  the sensitivity of  poverty  counts to key  assumptions  in their 
construction,  we  examine the  basis  for  the  assumptions,  and  we  explore 
whether the empirical evidence has anything useful to contribute. 
There are two problems in passing from family resources to individual wel- 
fare, one of which is the main topic of this paper. The first issue, on which 
we shall have little to say, is the intrahousehold  allocation of resources. The 
measurement of individual poverty requires a rule for assigning a welfare level 
to an individual, based on the consumption  or income level of the family or 
household in which he or she lives. Any rule inevitably contains implicit as- 
sumptions about how resources are shared between different household mem- 
bers, for example, by age or sex. The issue is at its most acute in developing 
countries, where the elderly typically live in extended families. For example, 
in India where 90 percent of them live with other people, it is impossible to 
use household survey data to make simple statements about the resources avail- 
able to elderly people. The issue is of rather  less importance in the United 
States, where a much larger fraction of the elderly  live alone or with other 
elderly adults. 
The second problem is the one to which we give most attention here. Even 
if resources are distributed equitably across household members, the size and 
age structure of households affects the welfare levels of their members. The 
same level of income or income per capita does not give the same standard of 
living to a large family as to a small one, or to an all-adult household compared 
with one with children. Larger households may be able to take advantage of 
“scale economies” through shared consumption of public goods in the house- 
hold, so that members of large households are likely to be better off than those 
of small households, even controlling for per capita income or total expendi- 
ture. Likewise, if  children cost less than  adults, then households  with more 
children will require lower incomes to achieve a specified standard of living, 
given total household size. These issues are likely to be of particular impor- 
tance when comparing poverty rates across age groups and are also likely to 
play out differently in countries with different living arrangements for elderly 
individuals.  In the United  States, where  the  elderly  typically  live  in  small 
households with few children, the treatment of  child costs is unlikely to have 
large effects on the numbers of old people in poverty, although it can poten- 
tially have large effects on the poverty of the old relative to the young. Even 
when old people live alone, so that we can measure their resources from a 
household survey, we cannot classify them as poor or nonpoor without a stan- 
dard of comparison, a standard that cannot be derived without assessing the 
needs of other nonelderly members of the population. The treatment of scale 171  Measuring Poverty among the Elderly 
economies is likely to be an important issue for both  absolute and relative 
poverty rates of the elderly. 
Our first task is to examine the sensitivity of poverty measures in the United 
States to assumptions about child costs and scale economies. We then attempt 
to estimate the size of scale economies and child costs. We proceed as follows. 
In section 6.2 we begin by  describing how official poverty measures are de- 
rived, and we present official poverty counts and rates for members of different 
age groups. The results are based on data from the 1993 Current Population 
Survey, which records information on  1992 incomes. We  show that poverty 
measures for different age groups are quite sensitive to the treatment of scale 
economies and costs of children. In section 6.3 we focus on the measurement 
of  scale economies and child costs, at a theoretical level and using data from 
the 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
6.2  Poverty and Age 
We start with a brief summary of how official poverty counts are derived in 
the United States. Further information can be obtained from Ruggles (1990) 
and National Research Council (1995). 
In the United States, an individual is said to be poor if he or she lives in a 
family whose total income falls below a poverty line, where the poverty line 
depends on the size and age structure of the household. Thus, all individuals 
within a family are either poor or nonpoor:  the implicit assumption is that 
resources are allocated fairly within households, so that all members have iden- 
tical welfare levels. Official poverty statistics are based on information from 
the March Current Population Surveys (CPSs), which are conducted annually 
and contain information on the demographic characteristics  and incomes of 
households. Income is before tax and includes cash transfer payments from the 
government but does not include nonmonetary transfers such as food stamps, 
health benefits, and subsidized housing. Several details deserve mention: 
(i) The CPS has a structure that distinguishes between households and fumi- 
lies. Although most households contain only one family, some contain multiple 
families, and others contain families that live with unrelated individuals. Of 
the 58,970 households surveyed in the 1993 CPS, 5,763 were not single-family 
households. For the purposes of measuring poverty, the Census Bureau com- 
bines the incomes of families and related subfamilies. For example, a married 
couple living with a son and daughter-in-law would be treated as a single fam- 
ily: their income would be combined and compared to the poverty line for a 
four-person family to determine whether all household members are in poverty. 
However, unrelated subfamilies and individuals are not considered part of the 
main family, and their poverty measures are based on their own incomes. For 
example, a person who boards with an unrelated family would be in poverty 
only if his or her personal income fell below the poverty line for a single per- 172  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
son. The poverty line would not be adjusted for the fact that such a person, 
because he or she does not live alone, may benefit from scale economies in 
consumption. 
This definition of families has some odd consequences. For example, un- 
married couples who live together are treated as separate families. Each is as- 
signed the poverty line of a single person, and each is defined to be poor if his 
or her personal income is below the line. This treatment of unmarried couples 
tends to increase poverty rates over what they would be if unmarried couples 
were treated the same as married couples, for two reasons. First, the U.S. pov- 
erty lines assume large economies of scale, so that the poverty line for a mar- 
ried couple is less than twice (in fact, only  1.29 times) the line for a single 
adult. Two unmarried  adults who live together and are both  in poverty can 
potentially move themselves out of poverty simply by getting married. Second, 
even with no scale economies built into poverty lines, treating unmarried cou- 
ples as if they are married will reduce poverty counts. Combining the incomes 
of  unmarried couples imposes a mean-preserving reduction in the spread of 
income per person, which can be expected to pull some observations out of 
the tails and thus lower poverty rates. This is exactly the same argument (in 
reverse) as in Haddad and Kanbur (1990), who show that poverty measures 
will be understated if it is assumed that resources are allocated equally across 
family members when in fact they are not. The fact that official U.S. poverty 
measures depend on legal marital  status is worrisome,  especially  given the 
increase in the numbers of coresiding unmarried couples over the past several 
decades. 
In what follows, we present poverty measures that are based on the official 
definition of a family, but we also present measures that are based on the total 
incomes of all members of a household (whether or not the members are re- 
lated). For these latter computations we use the poverty line that would be 
applied if all household members were related. Since we are interested in how 
household scale economies affect living standards, it makes sense to use the 
household (i.e., individuals living together in the same quarters) rather than 
the family (i.e., those related by blood or marriage) as the unit of analysis. The 
switch from a family to a household basis is also one of the recommendations 
of the National Academy study on the poverty line. 
(ii) The United States has used essentially the same set of poverty lines since 
the 1960s, adjusting them only for the effects of inflation. The lines depend on 
the size and age structure of households. They were originally calculated as 
the  cost  of  the  U.S. Department  of Agriculture’s  “low-cost  food  plan”  for 
households of different sizes and age structures, multiplied by three. The mul- 
tiplier of three was selected because it was the inverse of  the average budget 
share for food in a 1955 Department of Agriculture survey. Table 6.1 shows a 
subset of the poverty lines used in 1992 (and applied to the  1993 CPS data, 
which refer to 1992); to save space we have trimmed off poverty lines for fami- 
lies with more than six members and families with more than four children. 173  Measuring Poverty among the Elderly 
Table 6.1  U.S. Poverty Lines, 1992 
Related Children under 18 Years 
Size of Family  None  One  TkO  Three  Four 
One person 
Under 65 years 
65 years and over 
7,299 
6,729 
?L/o persons, with householder 
Under 65 years  9,395  9,670 
65 years and over  8,480  9,634 
Three persons  10,974  11,293  11,304 
Four persons  14,471  14,708  14,228  14,277 
Five persons  17,451  17,705  17,163  16,743  16,487 
Six persons  20,072  20,152  19,737  19,339  18,747 
Source: These poverty lines are reproduced from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Poverty in the United 
States: 1992 (Washington, D.C., 1993). table A, p. vii. 
Several features of the table are important for our analysis. First, the poverty 
lines for one- and two-person families depend on whether the reference person 
in the family is elderly.’ The implicit assumption embodied in the table is that 
older people need less money to achieve a given welfare level, and the poverty 
line of  an elderly person living alone is $570 less than that of  a nonelderly 
person living alone, a “discount” equal to 7.8 percent of the poverty line for 
the nonelderly person. Note, however, that this adjustment to the poverty line 
is made only if the reference person is elderly, and families containing elderly 
who are not the reference person receive no adjustment to their poverty lines. 
Second, the poverty lines in the table make implicit adjustments for the costs 
of  children and household size. As seems sensible, increases in family size 
result in less-than-proportional increases in the poverty line, holding the num- 
ber of children constant. Increases in the number of children, holding family 
size constant, also affect the poverty line, but in neither a simple nor a reason- 
able fashion. For example, the poverty line for a three-person family with no 
children is less than that of  a three-person family with one child. In this case 
the substitution of a child for an adult increases the poverty line by 2.9 percent. 
The implication is that children cost more than adults, which seems odd given 
that the poverty lines are based on baskets of food. The poverty lines for fami- 
lies with four people are even stranger; the line rises as we go from a four- 
adult family to a three-adult one-child family, falls as we  go to a two-adult 
two-child family, and then increases for a one-adult three-child family. Overall, 
1. In the CPS the term “reference person’’ is synonymous with the term “householder.” This 
person is defined in the CPS documentation as “the person (or one of the persons) in whose name 
the housing unit is owned or rented (maintained) or, if there is no such person, any adult member, 
excluding roomers, boarders, or paid employees.” If a married couple jointly owns or rents a home, 
either person may be designated as the reference person. 174  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
the poverty lines in table 6.1 contain the implicit assumptions that, given fam- 
ily size, old people are relatively cheap and children are relatively expensive. 
However, the poverty  lines  also imply economies of  scale, so that the high 
expense of children may be offset by the fact that children tend to live in larger 
families. These assumptions about costs of children and old people, and about 
scale economies, will affect any conclusions about the poverty of the old rela- 
tive to the young. We will return to these aspects of the table below, but they 
are useful to keep in mind when comparing official poverty rates across age 
groups. 
Table 6.2 provides estimates for the United States of the numbers and frac- 
tions of elderly people, nonelderly adults, and children less than  18 years of 
age in poverty, using the official poverty lines. The top panel uses family in- 
come to measure poverty, and the bottom panel uses household income. Indi- 
viduals living in “group quarters” were excluded for these and all subsequent 
calculations. Using official poverty lines, there are 10.9 million more poor chil- 
dren than poor elderly adults. Poverty rates for children are also higher (22.14 
percent vs. 12.87 percent), and poverty rates for elderly and nonelderly adults 
are very close. This is true whether we use the family or the household as the 
unit of analysis, although as is to be expected, poverty rates using household- 
level data are slightly lower for all age categories. 
Given the arbitrariness and controversy surrounding the choice of poverty 
lines, it is important to examine the extent to which these results are sensitive 
Table 6.2  U.S. Poverty Rates for Elderly Adults, Nonelderly Adults, 
and Children 













154,977  42,869  93,069  19,039 
253,924  67,062  156,035  30,827 
36,987  14,846  18,174  3,968 
14.57  22.14  11.65  12.87 
Household-Level Data 
3331  1  13,800  15,696  3,815 
13.12  20.58  10.06  12.38 
Source; The data used for this table are from the March 1993 Current Population Survey, which 
records  1992 income. The sample consists of all individuals who do not live in group quarters. 
The population weights from the “person” records were used to obtain population estimates. A 
person was defined to be poor if his or her family income (fop  panel) or household income (botrom 
panel) was below the relevant poverty line for his or her family (top  panel) or household (bot- 
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to how the lines are set. A useful way to address the question is to graph cumu- 
lative distribution functions for income for different groups (children, nonel- 
derly adults, and elderly adults) and see whether the distribution of living stan- 
dards of some groups first-order stochastically dominate those of other groups. 
If the distribution of one group stochastically dominates that of another, then 
the poverty rate for that group will be lower at any poverty line. An immediate 
difficulty is that there is no single poverty line for the United States. Rather, 
we have a set of poverty lines for families of  different sizes and composition. 
To draw the cumulative distributions we must first “rebase” family income to 
make it comparable across families with different sizes and numbers of chil- 
dren. Specifically, we choose families with two adults and two children as the 
“base,” with a poverty line of  $14,228 from table 6.1. The living standard of 
person i in familyfis then measured as 
where yf is the income of family f, zf is its poverty line, and z, is the poverty 
line of the base family. We then graph cumulative distribution functions for 
y$ for children, nonelderly adults, and elderly adults. 
The results of this exercise (which uses the family rather than the household 
as the unit of analysis) are shown in figure 6.1. The left-hand panel graphs the 
cumulative  distributions  for  the  three  groups.  Since we  are  interested  in 
whether the poverty counts are sensitive to choice of poverty line, we graph the 
distribution functions only up to $20,000, so any conclusions about stochastic 
dominance are restricted  to this range of income. The “base” poverty line of 
$14,228 is shown as a point of reference. The right-hand panel of the figure 
graphs two lines: the vertical difference between the cumulative distributions 
for elderly and nonelderly adults and the vertical difference between the distri- 
butions for children and nonelderly  adults. The figure shows that the living 
standards of adults first-order stochastically dominate those of children. The 
distribution functions for the elderly and nonelderly adults cross at an income 
cumulative distributions 
.2  I 
differences in cumulative distributions 
I  nonelderly 
0  5000  10000  15000  20000  0  5000  10000  15000  20000 
family income (2-adult 2-child base)  family income (2-adult 2-child base) 
Fig. 6.1  Cumulative distributions of family income by age group 176  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
level slightly below the poverty level, indicating that at lower poverty lines the 
elderly would be less poor than the nonelderly. This may reflect the fact that 
social security provides an income floor for most elderly citizens. 
The key question is how sensitive these results  are to treatments of child 
costs and scale economies different from those implicit in the official poverty 
lines. One straightforward exercise is to examine how the numbers change if 
the old-age “discount” to poverty lines is removed, so that one- and two-person 
families with an elderly reference person receive the same poverty line as do 
those  with  younger  reference  people.  The results  of  these  tabulations  are 
shown in table 6.3. When the unit  of  analysis is the family, the number of 
elderly in poverty increases by  716 thousand people, from 4 to 4.7 million 
people, and the rate of poverty among the elderly increases from 12.87 percent 
to 15.19 percent. There are only tiny increases in poverty among other groups, 
reflecting the fact that the old-age discount applies to only one- and two-person 
families  with  an  elderly reference person  and most elderly people  in two- 
person families live with other elderly people. 
The poverty lines in table 6.1 contain strong implicit assumptions about the 
costs of children and economies of scale, and it is useful to examine how pov- 
erty rates for different age groups change as the assumptions are modified. 
However, making ad hoc adjustments to the table of  poverty lines does not 
seem especially desirable. The approach we take is to specify the poverty line 
as a function of the age and size composition of the family and fit this function 
to the official poverty lines. We can then examine how sensitive poverty mea- 
sures are to child costs and scale economies by altering the parameters of the 
function. Specifically, we specify the poverty line for a family with A  adults 
and K children as 
Table 6.3  U.S. Poverty Rates with the Old-Age Discount Removed from 
Poverty Lines 













154,977  42,869  93,069  19,039 
253,924  67,062  156,035  30,827 
37,745  14,848  18,213  4,684 
14.86  22.14  11.67  15.19 
Household-Level Data 
34,062  13,800  15,736  4,526 
13.41  20.58  10.08  14.68 177  Measuring Poverty among the Elderly 
(1)  z(A, K) = z,(A + o-K)~, 
where the term (A + ame  represents the number of “adult equivalents” in the 
household and z, is the per capita poverty line for a base household. In what 
follows we refer to the term A  + aK as the “effective household size.” The 
parameter a  measures the cost of children relative to adults, and the parameter 
8 reflects economies of  scale. For example, a value of 8 equal to 0.5 implies 
that doubling effective household size A + aK multiplies the poverty line by 
the square root of 2, or 1.41. 
We take logarithms of equation (1) and fit the resulting equation to the actual 
data on poverty lines, numbers of adults, and numbers of children. Using the 
complete list of poverty lines, we obtain the estimates a = 1.3 and 8 = 0.47. 
The high value of a  reflects the fact that for smaller families the actual poverty 
lines increase as the numbers of children increase and the majority of families 
in our sample are small: 77.7 percent of families have fewer than four mem- 
bers, and less than 9 percent have more than four members. When we establish 
a baseline by recomputing age-specific poverty rates using the poverty lines 
estimated using equation (I), with cx = 1.3 and 8 = 0.47, we obtain estimates 
very similar to those using the actual poverty lines: the poverty rate among 
children is 22.0 percent, among nonelderly  adults is 11.5 percent, and among 
elderly adults is  14.4 percent. That the poverty rate among elderly adults is 
somewhat higher than the “official” rate of  12.87 percent in table 6.2 is not 
surprising, given that we have not built an old-age discount into our estimated 
poverty lines. 
We are now in a position to examine how changes in the costs of children, 
as measured by a,  and changes in scale economies, as measured by 8, affect 
the poverty of the old relative to other age groups. We  present these results 
graphically, by showing cumulative distributions of living standards for people 
in different age groups, where living standards are measured as 
as before, our “base” family has two adults and two children, so that for fami- 
lies of this type living standards are simply measured as family income. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to think about how we might expect changes 
in a  and 8 to affect the living standards of individuals relative to those in base 
households. Taking derivatives of the logarithm of equation (2) with respect to 
a  yields 
which is positive for households with  smaller ratios of  children  to effective 
household size than the base household and negative for others. Increases in 178  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
the cost of children raise the relative living standards of households with small 
fractions of members who are children and reduce the relative living standards 
of those with large fractions. The derivative with respect to 0 is 
(4) 
which  implies that increases in the  scale parameter  8 will raise the relative 
living standards of those in families with small numbers of effective members 
and lower the relative living  standards of  those in large families. Thus, the 
living arrangements of the elderly-the  size of  their families as well as the 
ratios of children to household  size-will  determine the effects that changes 
in child costs and scale economies have on living standards. 
Table 6.4 presents evidence on the family sizes and fractions of  members 
who are children for people of different ages. The elderly live in households 
that are on average smaller than those of children and nonelderly  adults. The 
average household size for an elderly person is 1.94, as opposed to 3.04 for a 
nonelderly adult and 4.38 for a child. In consequence, poverty measures that 
assume greater household scale economies will increase the poverty of the old 
relative to the young, with the primary beneficiaries of scale economies being 
children. Likewise,  the  average ratio  of  children  to family  size for elderly 
people is only 0.017, far lower than the average ratios of  0.203 for younger 
adults and 0.533 for children. Poverty measures that assume smaller costs of 
children will also increase the poverty of  the elderly relative to children and 
also increase their poverty relative to the younger adults with whom children 
reside. 
Table 6.4  U.S. Average Family and Household Composition 
Children  Nonelderly Adults  Elderly Adults 
Number of children 
Number of  nonelderly adults 
Number of elderly adults 
Children + adults 
Children/(children + adults) 
Number of children 
Number of nonelderly adults 
Number of elderly adults 
Children + adults 
Children/(children + adults) 
Family-Level Data 
2.39  .86 
1.95  2.10 
.04  .08 
4.38  3.04 
,533  ,203 
Household-Level Data 
2.42  .90 
2.02  2.23 
,037  .08 
4.8  1  3.21 










.O 1 8 
Note: The table shows averages, across all  people in  the relevant age category, of  family (top 
panel) and household (bottom  panel) characteristics. For example, children live in families that 
contain, on average, 2.39 children. 179  Measuring Poverty among the Elderly 
4  a  13 8-47  a=1.0,  8=.47 
’  1  =  ’ ’  -’  I elderly  ‘‘1  I e,lderly 
4,  a=.70, e=.47  , 
n  sono  innno  imno  20000  o  sono  innno  15non 20000 
.41  a=1.3.  e=.75  I  .41  a=1.0,13=.75  I 
n  soon  innoo  isnon  20000 
‘1  a=.70,  8=.75  I  elderly 
nonelderly  onelderly 0 
0  5000  10000  15000  20000  0  5000  10000  15000  20000  0  5000  iooon  15000  20000 
family income (2-adult 2-child base) 
Fig. 6.2  Cumulative distributions of income with changes in child costs and 
scale economies 
Figure 6.2 shows the effects of altering a  and 8 on the cumulative distribu- 
tions of family income in the United States. The top left-hand graph shows the 
distributions with a  = 1.3 and 0 = 0.47, the values obtained using the official 
poverty lines. Consistent with figure 6.1, the distribution of  living standards 
for children  is  stochastically  dominated  by  that  of  elderly  and nonelderly 
adults, and the lines for elderly and nonelderly cross near the official poverty 
line for the base family. As one moves from left to right, a  is decreased, from 
1.3 to 1.0 to 0.7. As expected, increases in child costs make the elderly less 
well off relative to children, and at a  = 0.7 the cumulative distributions for the 
elderly and for children cross at an income level only slightly above the official 
poverty line. The three graphs in the bottom panel also let a  vary from 1.3 to 
0.7, but use a scale parameter 8 equal to 0.75 instead of 0.47. Scale economies 
are less important at higher values of the scale parameter, and as expected the 
elderly become better off relative to others due to their smaller average fam- 
ily sizes. The information  in figure 6.2 is summarized in figure 6.3, which 
shows the differences  in the cumulative distributions similar to those shown 
in figure 6.1. 
The effects of changes in a  and 8 can also be seen in table 6.5, which shows 
the fraction of individuals with values of y$ less than the base poverty line of 
$14,228. Holding 8 fixed at 0.47, the poverty rate of the elderly increases from 
14.40 to 19.60 and the poverty rate of children declines from 22.02 to 21.61 as 
the cost of children declines from 1.3 to 0.7. It may seem counterintuitive that 
when child costs are lowered, the poverty rates of children fall very little and 
the poverty rates of  the elderly rise substantially. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that we have used a two-adult two-child family as the base and that 
the incomes of base families are unaltered by changes in a  and 8. Since a large 180  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
.2 1  elderly - nonelderly  I  a=.7  .2 
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I,  -.  1 
elderly - nonelderly 
8=.75  af.7 
1  a=1.3 
5000  10000  15000  20000 
children - nonelderly  a=1.3 
8=.75 
children - nonelderly  I 
8=.75 
0  5000  10000  I5000  20000  0  5000  I0000  15000  20000 
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Fig. 6.3  Differences in cumulative distributions with different assumptions 
about child costs and scale economies 
Table 6.5  U.S. Poverty Rates Using Different Base Household ‘Qpes 
Two-Adult Two-Child Base  One-Adult Base 
Child Costs and  Nonelderly  Elderly  Nonelderly  Elderly 
Scale Economies  Children  Adults  Adults  Children  Adults  Adults 
CY  = 1.3, 8 = 0.47  22.02  11.46  14.40  23.04  12.28  16.08 
CY  = 1.0,  8 = 0.47  21.84  11.97  16.54  21.60  11.81  15.97 
01  = 0.7, 8 = 0.47  21.61  12.66  19.60  19.49  11.11  15.90 
01  = 1.3, 8 = 0.75  22.36  9.75  5.79  35.51  18.21  20.29 
= LO,  e = 0.75  22.07  10.29  7.72  31.86  16.89  20.22 
CY  = 0.7, 8 = 0.75  21.62  11.03  1 1.04  27.90  15.48  20.12 
fraction of  children  live in two-adult two-child  families, we  are effectively 
guaranteeing that their poverty rates change little as (Y  is increased. The more 
general point is that the choice of base family has large effects on the measured 
levels of poverty. This is illustrated by the right-hand panel of table 6.5, which 
repeats the exercise using a one-adult no-child base. In this case, increases in 
a  reduce poverty  rates for all age groups,  since there are people in all age 
groups who live with children,  but reduce  the poverty  rate for children the 
most. 
Table 6.5 also shows the effects of changes in scale economies on relative 
poverty rates. In general, increases in 8 from 0.47 to 0.75 (holding  cx  fixed) 
increase  the poverty  of children relative to elderly  adults. This is to be ex- 181  Measuring Poverty among the Elderly 
pected, given that children live in families that are on average larger than those 
of other age groups. Again, however, the effect of changes in the scale parame- 
ter on absolute poverty rates depends on the definition of the base family. When 
the base is a two-adult two-child family, the poverty rate of children barely 
changes, while adult poverty rates decline. Using a one-adult base, increases 
in the scale parameter result in large poverty increases for all groups, with the 
largest increase for children. 
It is also useful to compare changes in poverty rates as one moves from the 
case in which both child costs and scale economies are high (i.e., a  = 1.3 and 
8 = 0.47) to a possibly more realistic case of lower child costs and scale econo- 
mies (i.e., a  = 0.70 and 8 = 0.75). These changes in a  and 8 have offsetting 
effects, since large families tend to have more children. Using a two-adult two- 
child base, the poverty rates of children and nonelderly adults are largely un- 
changed, and that of the elderly declines by less than 4 points. Thus, it is pos- 
sible that modifying the official poverty lines so that they imply lower child 
costs and lower scale economies will leave aggregate poverty rates for different 
age groups largely unchanged. This does not imply, however, that the same 
people will be in poverty under the two scenarios. 
The conclusion of this section is that the age distribution of poverty is quite 
sensitive to the treatment of child costs and economies of scale. Official esti- 
mates of the numbers and percentages of people in different age groups in 
poverty hinge on poverty lines that contain strong implicit assumptions about 
child costs and scale economies. Deviations from the assumptions implicit in 
official poverty lines result in very different poverty measures for different 
age groups. 
In section 6.3, we examine the empirical evidence on household consump- 
tion patterns in a (not very successful) attempt to establish a less arbitrary basis 
for the costs of children and household economies of scale. As we shall see, 
there are good reasons to be skeptical of the results. Nevertheless, to the extent 
that there are results, they are consistent with a value of a  around 0.75 and a 
value of 0 of 0.85 or even higher, Such figures generate poverty counts close 
to those shown in the last row of table 6.5, with a  = 0.70 and 0 = 0.75. 
6.3  Calculating Equivalence Scales 
6.3.1  Introduction 
The official poverty lines in the United  States differ for different family 
sizes as shown in table 6.1. These differentials come from differences in food 
purchasing patterns in the 1955 survey that Mollie Orshansky used to construct 
the original poverty line. In consequence, the equivalence scales implicit in the 
table have some basis in behavior, although, as we have seen, the pattern of 
child costs and economies of scale is not easy to defend. Several alternatives 
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Ruggles (1990) suggests that the scale be proportional to the square root of 
household size, so that two adults are equivalent to 1.41 single adults, three 
adults to  1.73 single adults, and so on. As discussed in section 6.2, this rule 
approximates the Orshansky scale while removing  some of  its stranger fea- 
tures. Larger families are also typically those with larger numbers of children, 
and the square root rule should be seen as reflecting not only economies of 
scale but also that children cost less than adults. It is also possible explicitly to 
separate adults and children, and the recent report on the poverty line by the 
National Academy (National Research Council 1995) recommends that scales 
be calculated according to the formula used above, namely, (A  + ame  for A 
adults and K children, and recommends values around 0.75 for both a  and 8. 
Alternatively, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(1982) has  suggested a scale in  which  the first adult counts as unity, other 
adults as 0.7, and children as 0.5, so that economies of  scale are not allowed 
for explicitly but are reflected in the discount for additional adults and a rela- 
tively low cost of children. 
In this section, we use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) 
in 1990 to try to tease out information about the relative costs of children and 
adults, and about the extent of economies of scale. That these data should be 
relevant for such an exercise seems obvious. The CEX collects information on 
purchases of goods that are differentially consumed by adults and by children 
and can be used to infer how these purchases change with the composition of 
the family. Economies of scale presumably arise because some goods are pub- 
lic and can be shared by several members of the household, and an expenditure 
survey can tell us how  the balance between  private and public goods shifts 
with household size and composition. Even so, attempts to infer equivalence 
scales from budget data have a long and discouraging history. Although expen- 
diture data are relevant to the construction of scales, they are insufficient by 
themselves to identzh scales. Additional identifying assumptions are required, 
and it has been difficult to find such assumptions that are widely acceptable. 
Worse still, many of  the estimates in the literature have been  derived under 
identifying assumptions that are not made explicit, so that it is difficult or im- 
possible to know what the results mean. 
We  devote  subsection  6.3.2 to the theoretical issues:  to the  identification 
issue and what it does and does not imply and to the basis for our calculations 
of child costs and economies of scale. The former rests on familiar ground and 
calculates the costs of children by comparing the behavior of expenditure on 
adult goods across households with different numbers of children. The latter 
uses a new method, suggested to one of us by Jean Drkze, that uses expendi- 
tures on private goods to identify the economies of scale to household size that 
operate through public goods. 
6.3.2  Identifying Equivalence Scales 
We begin by explaining what cannot be done, and the consequences of try- 
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numbers, and both begin from a description of household preferences in terms 
of the cost or expenditure function. If total household expenditure is x, and if 
this is efficiently spent to maximize the collective utility of a family of A adults 
and K children, say, then we can write 
(5)  c(u,p,A,K)  = x , 
where u is the collective utility level. By analogy with cost-of-living numbers, 
the number of single adult equivalents in a family with A adults and K children 
is (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, 205) 
an expression that, in general, will depend on prices and on the level of real 
income of the family. Since the cost function provides a convenient summary 
of the family’s preferences, and since once specified it can be used to yield a 
set of demand functions, there is an apparently straightforward way of calculat- 
ing the equivalence scale in equation (6).  Write down some suitable cost func- 
tion (eq. [5]),  for example, a translog or almost ideal system, recover the pa- 
rameters by estimating the associated demand functions, and fill in equation 
(6).  This is what is done, for example, by Slesnick (1993) in his recalculation 
of poverty in the United States. 
Pollak and Wales (1979) have shown that such calculations of equivalence 
scales ignore the central identification problem that the data do not identify the 
equivalence scales. In particular, Pollak and Wales point out that all cost func- 
tions of the form 
(7) 
have the same demand functions irrespective of the function + provided only 
that it is monotone increasing in u. Relabeling indifference curves in a way 
that depends on family structure has no effect on demand functions, although 
it clearly changes how we should measure welfare. As a result, the data do not 
allow us to calculate equivalence scales without additional assumptions that 
pin down the function +. 
At first blush, it is tempting to associate the identification issue with the fact 
that parents get utility from children and to try to separate “economic” welfare 
as represented from the structure of the cost function from the “psychic” wel- 
fare that is captured by the function 4. But this hope is not only imprecise, it 
is wrong, as the following example shows. Consider families that contain only 
adults, and suppose that we model economies of scale by writing 
c(+<u, -4  K),  p,  A K) 
so that for 0 5  1 there are economies of  scale; we want to estimate 0. To fix 
ideas, suppose that the cost function for the single-adult household takes the 
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(9)  c(u,p,A)  = Aec(u,p,l) = Aeu(p)  + Aeb(p)u, 
where u(p)  and b(p)  are linearly homogeneous functions of the vector of prices 
p. The demand functions are derived from equation (9) in the usual way; the 
budget shares take the form 
where cr,(p)  and p,(p)  are the elasticities with respect to the ith price of a(p) 
and b(p),  respectively. (That the budget shares for a family of A adults with 
outlay x  are the same as the budget shares for a family with one adult and 
outlay x/AR  is a general feature of cost functions of the multiplicative form [8].) 
According to equations (9) and (lo), preferences and the associated behavior 
are each weighted averages of preferences at subsistence a(p)  with associated 
budget shares a,(p)  and preferences at bliss b(p)  with associated budget shares 
p,(p).  Given specifications for a(p)  and b(p),  the demand functions (10) can 
be taken to the data, and 8 estimated together with the other parameters; see, 
for example, Lanjouw  and Ravallion’s (1995) work for Pakistan, where the 
parameter 8 is estimated to be around 0.6. 
Economies of scale in equation (8) operate multiplicatively through the cost 
function, so that in equation (9) costs at subsistence and costs at bliss are sub- 
ject to the same economies. But because of  fixed costs or other effects, the 
economies of scale might be more or less effective at higher levels of living. 
One way of generalizing equation (10) to allow this would be to write 
(1  1)  c(u,p,A) = Aeu(p) + A*b(p)u, 
where 8 and $ are not necessarily equal. If  we now derive the demand func- 
tions from these new preferences, either by elementary calculation or by appli- 
cation of the Pollak and Wales (1  979) theorem, we once again retrieve equation 
(10). Hence, as far as their empirical implications are concerned, equations (9) 
and (1  1) are indistinguishable. As a corollary, if we take equation (10) to the 
data and obtain an estimate of 8, it has no particular claim on our attention as 
a measure of the extent of economies of scale. The scales used in Slesnick’s 
(1993) reworking of the poverty count are obtained by a generalization of the 
technique outlined above and are subject to the same criticism. Slesnick’s and 
Lanjouw and Ravallion’s estimates are identified by assuming that the particu- 
lar cardinalization of utility that they chose is correct, rather than the infinite 
number of other cardinalizations that are indistinguishable on the data but that 
would give different results for the scales. Indeed, since Slesnick‘s results are 
perhaps even more bizarre than those in the official scales, it is comforting to 
know  that they can be arbitrarily  “corrected”  without  consequences for the 
empirical evidence from which they were obtained. 
By itself, the empirical evidence on expenditure patterns  cannot generate 
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form of prior information that links welfare to behavior. It is to these we now 
turn. 
6.3.3  Alternative Identification Schemes for Child Costs and Economies 
of Scale 
The most famous and venerable  of  the schemes for linking behavior and 
welfare is Engel's supposition that families with the same share of food in their 
budgets are equally well off, irrespective of  size and composition. The food 
share assumption serves as an all-purpose scale identifier, allowing us to mea- 
sure both child costs and economies of scale. For the former, we start from a 
two-adult family (say) and calculate for any given level of outlay the additional 
amount that would be required to bring a two-adult  one-child family to the 
same food share, which by assumption would be at the same level of welfare. 
We can equally well equate food shares for a large and a small family so as to 
calculate the relative outlays that make them equally well off and so estimate 
any economies of scale. If the cost function is multiplicatively  separable in 
family characteristics on the one hand and prices and utility on the other-as  is 
equation (S)-the  food share, or any other budget share, does indeed indicate 
welfare, so the method is consistent with a well-defined theoretical structure. 
Furthermore,  the  assumption  that  the  food  share  indicates  welfare  solves 
the identification impasse; for example, it is easy to check that the food share 
indicates welfare if the cost function is equation (9), but not when the cost 
function is equation (11). The Engel assumption ties down the function 4 in 
equation (7). 
Engel's assumption is the kind of assumption that we need, but it is not the 
right one. As first argued by Nicholson (1976) and elaborated by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1986), Engel's assumption is quite implausible. The addition of a 
child with full compensation would normally increase the food share, not leave 
it unchanged, in which case the Engel compensation is too large. A better pro- 
cedure for measuring child costs uses expenditure on adult goods as an indica- 
tor of adult welfare and calculates the compensation that would be required 
after the addition of  the child in order to restore adult expenditures to their 
previous level. This method was first proposed by Rothbarth (1943) and has 
been used in the United States by Betson (1990) and (more or less) by Lazear 
and Michael (1988). The Rothbarth procedure is not without its problems. In 
particular, it takes no account of possible substitution toward adult goods in the 
presence of additional children, or of broader rearrangements of consumption 
patterns that might follow the addition of  a child. There is also a shortage of 
well-measured adult goods in the data. The procedure inevitably uses expendi- 
tures on adult clothing and footwear, alcohol, and tobacco, and the last two are 
much underestimated in the CEX-as  in other expenditure surveys around the 
world-see  Gieseman (1987). Even so, the Engel method is clearly wrong, 
and the transparency of Rothbarth's method and its identification assumptions 
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lence scales from demand systems augmented by demographic variables. We 
present some results using Rothbarth’s method below. 
The calculation of  economies of  scale has a less well trodden history. Al- 
though the Engel method provides estimates of scale economies, there is no 
reason to credit them without  some theory of why, in the presence of public 
goods, the food share should correctly indicate welfare between families with 
different numbers of people. Indeed, there are good reasons for supposing that 
the Engel method will give the wrong answer. The argument follows much the 
same lines as Nicholson’s argument about Engel’s method for calculating child 
costs, and we shall adopt a solution that is similar to the Rothbarth method in 
that case. 
Suppose that there exists a pure private good that is not substitutable for 
public goods, food being the obvious example. Consider what happens when 
family size increases, for example, by combining two single adults into a fam- 
ily of two adults. Suppose too that compensation is paid, presumably negative 
compensation since the scale economies in the public good will make the fam- 
ily better off if the two original incomes are simply combined. Because less of 
the public good is needed than in the two separate single-person families, and 
because there is no substitution from the private to the public good, the budget 
share of the private good will increase. But according to Engel, a family with 
a higher food share must be worse off, and less money should be taken away. 
In consequence, Engel’s method will overstate the amount of  money needed 
for the larger household and thus understate the extent of and discount from 
economies of scale. 
In our own empirical work in this paper, we adopt an approach to economies 
of  scale that parallels  Rothbarth‘s procedure  for measuring  child costs. We 
measure child costs by examining adult goods, and we measure economies of 
scale by examining the behavior of private goods as household size changes. 
Consider again the example of the previous paragraph in which two people, 
previously in single-person families, come together to form a two-person fam- 
ily. As before, they no longer need as much heat and light, kitchens, bathrooms, 
and (possibly) bedrooms so that they have more for private goods, whose share 
of the budget can be expected to increase. If nothing else happens, we could 
calculate the extent of the economies of  scale, not by  restoring the share of 
private goods to its previous value, but by  calculating the reduction in total 
income that  would  restore the  previous per capita consumption of  private 
goods. If the reduction is (say) 20 percent of  total outlay, we have established 
that there is a 20 percent discount for two people over one. The major caveat 
is that public goods are effectively  cheaper in larger households; an oriental 
rug or a painting costs the same but provides pleasure to twice as many people. 
In consequence, there will be  substitution away from private toward  public 
goods, so that a fully compensated two-person family will have lower per cap- 
ita consumption of private goods than will the two single-person families com- 
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sumption of private goods is less than the utility-preserving  reduction and so 
understates the extent of economies of scale. This effect will be small if private 
goods are not substitutable for public goods, as, for example, food for housing, 
or we can calculate the income reduction for a range of private goods and 
select the one that gives the largest reduction. Although both this method and 
the Engel (food share) method will understate economies of  scale, the latter 
will do so even in the absence of substitution between private and public goods 
and will therefore understate by more. 
Alternative methods and estimates of economies of scale have been provided 
by  Nelson (1988) and in the National Academy report. The latter starts from 
the estimates of  child costs obtained by the Rothbarth procedure in Betson 
(1990), who made separate calculations according to the number of adults in 
the family. His results can therefore be used to give the costs of an additional 
child relative to an adult in one-adult families, in two-adult families, and so 
on. If it is supposed that the number of adult equivalents is approximated by 
the  formula  (A  + aKJe, with  parameters the  same for  different household 
types, then the differences in child costs across different family types reflect 
economies of scale and can be used to measure them. In particular, in a family 
with A adults and K children, the cost of an additional child relative to an adult 
is given by the formula [(A  + a(K + l))/(A + aK)le,  which can be fitted to 
Betson’s results to obtain estimates of a  and 8. The calculations in the report 
suggest values of  around 0.75 for both a  and 8. Unlike the Engel procedure, 
this method appears to be soundly based, at least if we accept the Rothbarth 
method of estimating child costs. Even so, it can provide only a summary of 
the  scale economies and yields no insight into the process by which public 
goods work within the household. Nor does it ensure that we are measuring 
economies of scale rather than (for example) the possibility that larger house- 
holds devote less to additional children for some other reason. 
Nelson  assumes that different goods exhibit different economies of scale, 
and she uses CEX data on all adult families to estimate a demand system that, 
following Barten (1964), allows explicitly for the patterns of substitution that 
come from the changes in effective relative prices that are induced by the dif- 
ferential  economies  of  scale. Although  the  identification  of  welfare  is  left 
implicit,  Nelson’s  procedures  are  theoretically  consistent  with  the  method 
adopted below. Her model assumes that economies of scale work so that the 
fractions of family consumption of each good received by each person can add 
up to a total different from unity, and that the sum of these fractions is different 
for different goods, being larger than unity for goods with economies of scale. 
Because she makes no allowance for fixed costs, economies of scale can only 
operate this way  and must result in substitution effects in line with the price 
effects that the  scaling factors are designed to mimic. She works with five 
broad groups of goods and finds that all display economies of scale; for hous- 
ing there are implausibly large economies, with each member of a two-person 
household receiving twice as much in housing services as would each in a one- 188  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
person household. Nelson attributes the result to the fact that, in her data, two- 
person households spend almost the same amount on housing as one-person 
households, in spite of  having incomes that are 50 percent higher. It is also 
possible that the Barten model should bear some of the blame; high economies 
of scale act so as to diminish needs and thus consumption, but they also cause 
an offsetting substitution effect toward the good. When this price effect is sub- 
stantial, and the data show that two people spend much the same on housing 
as one person, the model responds by choosing a very large value for the econ- 
omies of scale.  But  it is also possible  that  the model is incorrect, and that 
economies of scale operate differently, as would be the case if there are fixed 
costs. 
6.3.4  Using Adult Goods to Estimate Child Costs 
We used data from the  1990 CEX to examine the behavior of expenditure 
on adult goods over families with differing numbers of children. Expenditure 
on adult goods is defined, as is usual, as the sum of expenditures on alcohol, 
tobacco, and adult clothing and footwear. The 1990 CEX has 20,517 observa- 
tions in total, and we use all of  these in the analysis. The CEX is a rolling 
panel, in which each household is (in theory) interviewed five times at three- 
month intervals and asked about consumption in the previous three months. 
New households are added as other households exit the survey. Because each 
interview generates an observation, there are only 10,127 different households 
in the sample. Of these, 3,893 are interviewed once, 3,053 twice, 2,206 three 
times, and 975 four times. The lower numbers of households with three and 
four observations are accounted for by  the fact that some households miss in- 
terviews or drop out of the survey before completing all five interviews: 953 
of our households do not complete the full series of interviews or have “gaps” 
between interviews. 
We define total expenditure as the sum of expenditures on food, both away 
and at home, alcohol, tobacco, clothing, housing, transportation excluding pur- 
chases of new cars, entertainment, personal care, medical expenditures, read- 
ing materials, and educational expenditures. The Bureau of  Labor Statistics 
computes these semiaggregated expenditure items from the more finely de- 
tailed expenditure information collected by the survey and puts them in the 
“summary expenditure section” of the CEX data tape. It should be noted that 
“housing”  is broadly  defined to include utilities,  household furnishings, and 
household  equipment. Furthermore, the cost of  an owner-occupied house is 
measured as actual interest payments on mortgages and not as the rental value 
of the house. This definition of total expenditure is the conditioning variable 
in our Engel curves, and when we calculate the compensation required to re- 
store adult expenditures to prechild levels, it is the increase in this measure of 
the total that is used. The validity of the procedure requires that  additional 
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children on income through changes in labor supply, as well as on saving. To 
the extent that children decrease this definition of total expenditure-which 
seems the more probable outcome-the  costs of children will be understated 
by the amount of the decrease. 
In this section and the next, we start with a nonparametric analysis, to ex- 
plore whether the data are at all consistent with the underlying hypothesis, and 
then use the results to suggest the more parametric forms that allow the inclu- 
sion of a wider range of covariates. For the analysis of adult goods and child 
costs, the nonparametric analysis adopts the obvious procedure of fitting adult 
good Engel curves for different family types, comparing households with and 
without children. The CEX sample will support such an analysis for a limited 
number of family types; table 6.6 lists the number of families by combinations 
of adults and children. Given these, it makes sense to fit nonparametric regres- 
sions for adult-child combinations of (l,O), (l,l),  (1,2), (2,0), (2,1), (2,2), (2,3), 
(3,1), and (3,2). We do this by calculating the regression function of adult ex- 
penditures (in dollars per month) conditional on the logarithm of total annual 
expenditure using a version of Fan’s (1992) local regression smoother. In order 
to exclude areas of low density at the extremes of rich and poor, we trim the 
sample to the range of log total outlay shown and then erect a 100-point uni- 
form grid  over log outlay. At each point x on this  grid, we run a weighted 
regression with weights given by the quartic kernel: 
(12) 
wt =  EA,(l - t‘)’,  If,I  5  1, 
=  0,  If1 >  1, 
where tl is the distance of x, from x  in units of the bandwidth h, 
(13)  t, =  (X - x,)/h. 
The bandwidth h is chosen by visual inspection of alternative estimates in an 
attempt to preserve genuine structure while eliminating random fluctuations. 
The multiplier  AL  is an inflation factor, provided in the CEX, that accounts for 
the fact that the CEX is not a simple random sample. For each observation  i, 
Table 6.6  Number of Households by Composition, CEX 1990 
Children 
Adults  0  I  2  3  4 
1  5,567  554  37 1  16.5  48 
2  5,452  1,943  2,047  953  258 
3  1,195  463  255  126  47 
4  406  146  57  52  9 
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A, is equal to the number of households in the U.S. population that the observa- 
tion represents, so observations that represent more households are given more 
weight in the regressions. 
The results are shown in figure 6.4  for one-adult, two-adult, and three-adult 
nonpoor  families. We restrict our sample to families above the poverty  line 
because families in poverty have very different consumption  patterns,  as we 
shall see in subsection 6.3.6.  Although the ordering of  the curves is not uni- 
formly monotone over the range of total outlay, the ordering is generally in the 
right direction, and certainly so in the middle of the total expenditure distribu- 
tion. Holding total expenditure constant, the addition of children reduced ex- 
penditure on adult goods. Note also that the slopes of the regression functions 
are positive, a condition that must be satisfied if we are to calculate the varia- 
tions in total expenditure that would have effects on adult expenditure equiva- 
lent to the addition of children. It is also a condition that is often not satisfied 
in practice; see, for example, Cramer (1969). 
The curves in figure 6.4  are close to one another so that the estimates of 
child costs that they imply are relatively modest. The mean of log outlay for 
(1,O) households is 8.06;  conditional on this, adult expenditure is predicted to 
be $252  a month. To have the same predicted adult expenditure, a (1,l) house- 
hold would need a log outlay of 8.34,  and a (1,2) household 8.52.  One child 
costs 28 percent of a single adult, and two children (together) 46  percent of  an 
adult. For a (2,O)  family, an additional child is 32 percent of one adult, two 
children 72 percent, and three children 76 percent. For three-adult families, 
the first child costs 54 percent of an adult, two children 90 percent of an adult. 
While these numbers might make sense for India or a similarly poor country, 
they seem unreasonably small for the United States. 
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Alcohol  and tobacco are two items that are notoriously  underestimated in 
household expenditure surveys, including the CEX, so it is wise to reestimate 
the results using only adult clothing and footwear.  But the results are very 
similar; if anything child costs are estimated to be somewhat lower. This ech- 
oes Betson’s (1990)  findings that the results are not much affected by the choice 
of  the broad  or narrow  definition  of  adult expenditures. Another  potential 
source of underestimation is that children consume some of the adult goods. If 
so, the addition of the child will have a direct positive effect on consumption 
as well as the negative income effect, so that expenditure on adult goods will 
be reduced by too little, and child costs underestimated. For alcohol, tobacco, 
and adult clothing, this is unlikely to be a problem for young children, but it 
may well be serious for teenagers. However, it is difficult to allow for child age 
in the nonparametric regressions, so we move to a flexible parametric model. 
Our general approach, for the investigation of both child costs and econo- 
mies of scale, is to allow total expenditure to enter the regression function in 
a general  way,  while  other variables enter linearly. There is a great deal of 
information in the data about the shape of the Engel curve, and it is desirable 
to use it. Because family size and compositional variables are correlated with 
total expenditure, a failure to model the shape of the Engel curve is likely to 
compromise the estimates in which we are interested. The model we estimate 
is written 
where e, is expenditure on adult goods, n is household size, x  is total outlay, 
and nk is the number of people in the kth age-sex category in the household. 
The right-hand side is motivated by the wish to approximate the “obvious” but 
nonlinear form 
which, with an extension to different types of children, is the form with which 
we began. 
We proceed as follows. Equation (14) is first estimated with per capita outlay 
entered linearly, followed by the Fourier specification 
M 
f(t)  = u,,  + uIt + u2t2  + C(g,cos(it) + q,sin(it)), 
,=I  (16) 
for which we have generally found that setting M equal to 2 is adequate. The 
equation is estimated for both narrow (clothing) and broad (clothing, alcohol, 
and tobacco) definitions of adult goods and is estimated separately for one- 
adult, two-adult, and three-adult households. Family composition is disaggre- 192  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
gated by age and sex, so that we have males  and females aged 0-5,  6-1  1, 
12-17,  18-64,  and 65 or older. Since the 10 ratios sum to one, we omit that 
associated with females aged 65 or over, which therefore becomes the refer- 
ence group. 
The regression  results are not shown in detail, but a few points  are worth 
noting since they affect the calculations of child costs. The Fourier approxima- 
tion always improves the fit, but the effects on the other parameter estimates 
are modest, so we can focus on the more easily interpreted linear form. Cloth- 
ing and footwear has an expenditure  elasticity that is greater than  unity, in 
contrast to the broad aggregate, which is dominated by alcohol and tobacco, 
the share of which declines with total outlay. The compositional effects work 
more or less as anticipated. As is required for the model to make any sense, 
additional prime-age adults increase expenditure on adult goods, although it is 
adult women  who  spend most  on adult clothing, with little effect for men. 
Additional children decrease expenditure on adult goods, or at least they do 
until they are 12 years old, at which point they smoke and drink and, if they 
are girls, buy adult clothing. We clearly cannot use expenditure on these goods 
to estimate the costs of older children. 
Table 6.7 presents the estimates of child equivalences, calculated separately 
according to (1) whether we are using all adult expenditure or just clothing, 
and (2)  whether we are using the Fourier approximation or the linear model. 
The numbers are calculated as follows. In the top panel, we consider the addi- 
tion of  a child to a family containing a single adult female aged  18-64.  By 
equation (14) if fl.) has the linear form c1 + p In x, adult expenditure in the 
new larger household will be the same as in the original smaller household if, 
when the original household has expenditure x, the new one has expenditure 
x* given by 
where yCf  is the coefficient of the adult female ratio and 7, is the coefficient of 
the child ratio in which we are interested. The top panel in the table shows In 
(x*/x) - 1, the proportional  additional cost of  the  child. For the two-adult 
family, the corresponding formula is 
where y,,  is the adult male coefficient and the numbers presented in the table 
are scaled-that  is, 2(ln(x*/x) -  1) in order to present the child cost relative 
to a single adult rather than a couple. The three-adult household is taken to be 
an adult male, an adult female, and an elderly female, and the costs are calcu- 
lated in the corresponding way. When the Fourier approximation to the Engel 
curve is used, it is no longer possible to derive a closed-form expression for 193  Measuring Poverty among the Elderly 
Table 6.1  Estimated Child Costs Relative to Single Adults for Various Family 
Types by Child Age and Sex (percent) 
All Adult Expenditures  Adult Clothing and Footwear 
Family Type  Linear Form  Flexible Form  Linear Form  Flexible Form 
Adult female plus 
Boy 0-5 
Girl 0-5 
Boy 6-1  1 
Girl 6-1  1 
Boy  12-17 
Girl 12-17 
Adult couple plus 
BOY  0-5 
Girl 0-5 
Boy 6-1  1 
Girl 6-1  1 
Boy  12-17 
Girl 12-17 
Three adults plus 
BOY  0-5 
Girl 0-5 
Boy 6-1  1 
Girl 6-1  1 










































































Notes: The three-adult household is an adult male, an adult female, and a female aged 65 or over. 
The calculations for the linear form are exact; those for the Fourier flexible form are approxima- 
tions. 
child costs. Instead, we use as an approximation equations (17) and (1 8) with 
p replaced by the derivative of the Engel curve with respect to log expenditure 
evaluated at the mean of log total expenditure. We make no attempt to calculate 
child  costs  for  children  other  than  the  first.  While  such  calculations  are 
straightforward in principle, the differences from the cost of the first child are 
effectively determined by the choice of functional form (14),  rather than by 
any genuine feature of the data. 
In terms of the broad orders of magnitude with which we are concerned, the 
child cost estimates in table 6.7 are sensitive neither to the choice of functional 
form for the Engel curve nor to the broad or narrow definition of adult goods. 
As expected, the estimates for the older children are much too low; “children” 
between ages 12 and 17 clearly consume these “adult” goods. But the differen- 
tiation by age has solved the underestimation problem in the nonparametric 
results, so that children under age 12 appear to cost around two-thirds to three- 
quarters of an adult. Comparing the results for single-adult and two-adult fami- 
lies. there is not much evidence of the reduction in child costs that would be 194  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
expected from economies of  scale, although the estimates based on clothing 
are lower for the smallest children. However, child costs do seem to be lower 
for the three-adult households. Even so, we could not obtain useful results by 
following the National Academy procedure and identifying economies of scale 
by matching the numbers in the table to the ratio of (A + ame  to A@  with K = 
I. To measure economies of scale. we must turn to more direct methods. 
6.3.5  Using Private Goods and Economies of Scale 
In this subsection we report our attempts to obtain estimates of economies 
of scale by looking at the relationship between expenditure on private goods, 
expenditure per head, and family size. The basic idea is illustrated in figure 
6.5, which shows the relationship between expenditure per capita on private 
goods-or  on any single private good or group of private goods-and  income 
(or total expenditure) per head. The lower curve is the private good Engel curve 
for the smaller household with n, members, all of  whom are assumed to be 
adults. Consider an increase to n2 adults with per capita income held constant, 
for example, when  two single adults get married. Since they have the same 
total resources as before, it is possible for them to keep their consumption 
pattern  unchanged. However, we would not expect this to happen  since the 
larger family thereby ignores the potential economies of scale associated with 
public goods. Since the nature of public goods is that they do not have to be 
duplicated for each household member, the larger household need spend less 
on them, freeing more resources for private  goods, so that the Engel curve 
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moves upward as shown. The graph shows the amount 6 by which per capita 
income must be reduced so as to restore private expenditures to their previous 
per capita level. If this amount were deducted from the income of the larger 
family, that family would still be better off  than the  smaller family, since a 
correctly compensated family would presumably take advantage of the relative 
cheapness of  public  goods to substitute in  their  favor and  would  therefore 
spend less on private  goods. The calculation of 6 therefore understates the 
discount from economies of scale. It would be possible to correct for this un- 
derestimation by estimating a full demand system that allows for the pricelike 
effects of economies of scale as in Nelson (1988); the understatement can be 
minimized by selecting a private good that is a relatively poor substitute for the 
public goods in the household. For example, people are unlikely to substitute 
housing and utilities for food just because utility is cheaper through the former 
the larger is household size. 
We  therefore began  our investigations  with food. Although there may be 
some economies  of  scale associated with  food-bulk  buying, reduction  of 
wastage, and saving on items such as cooking oil that are used less than propor- 
tionately with scale-the  effects seem likely to be modest. There is the further 
advantage that food is a poor substitute for the most likely public goods. Nev- 
ertheless, to our considerable surprise, expenditure on food does not behave as 
illustrated in figure 6.5. Holding constant per capita outlay, per capita expendi- 
ture on food decreases  with family size, which suggests that the larger the 
family, the less food each member needs to remain equally well off. Our pre- 
liminary investigations for Britain, France, Taiwan, Thailand, and South Africa 
suggest that this result is true much more broadly than for the United States; 
the results in Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995) and Ayadi et al. (1995) appear to 
show the same result in Pakistan and Tunisia, respectively. The detailed evi- 
dence would take us too far afield from our main purpose, and a fuller report 
is contained in Deaton and Paxson (forthcoming). Here we confine ourselves 
to the main results for the United States, to some possible explanations, and to 
the search for economies of scale through other potential private goods. 
Figure 6.6 shows the  locally  weighted  nonparametric regressions for the 
food share conditional on the logarithm of per capita expenditure for house- 
holds with one to four nonelderly adults and zero children. Although the argu- 
ment in figure 6.5 was presented  in terms of per capita food expenditure in- 
creasing with family size, the same argument applies to the food share in the 
budget, which is the ratio of  per capita food expenditure to per  capita total 
expenditure, and the latter is being held constant as family size is changed. 
Although the relationship between the four curves changes with the level of 
per capita outlay, the one-adult curve is highest through most of the range, and 
the four-adult curve is the lowest. The curves for two and three adults are close 
to one another and cross more than once. At the same level of per capita outlay, 
one-adult households spend more per capita on food than do two- or three- 
adult households, who in turn spend more than four-adult households. While 196  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
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it is possible to think of reasons why one-adult families are special-they  eat 
out a great deal, or they buy expensive precooked food, or they waste a great 
deal of food-it  is hard to reconcile the results for the other family types with 
the presumption that food is a private good and that economies of scale operate 
through nonfood public goods. 
In order to investigate whether the same phenomenon holds for more com- 
plex family types and survives the conditioning on a wider range of variables, 
we once again have to move to a more parametric treatment. In parallel with 
our earlier discussion of child costs and adult goods, we adopt a flexible func- 
tional form for the food budget share of the form 
where w, is the food share and T  is a dummy indicating whether the family 
falls below  the official poverty line, a dummy that is provided  on the CEX 
tape. Although not shown in equation (19), we also interact household size and 
the  demographic compositional  variables  with  the poverty  dummy. This is 
done, not because poverty itself changes demand patterns-and  if it did, the 
effect would be picked up by a sufficiently flexible functionfl-)-but  because 
families in poverty, depending on their demographic composition, are eligible 
for food stamps, housing benefits, and other programs that are likely to change 
their consumption patterns. 
As before, we treat the functionfl.)  in more than one way: (a) using  the 
linear specification a  + Poln  xln, (b) using the Fourier flexible form (16), and 197  Measuring Poverty among the Elderly 
(c) following a nonparametric technique of Estes and Honor6 (1995).  The last 
works by first sorting the data according to the values of xln and then fitting 
equation (19) by ordinary least squares to the first-difference of all the right- 
hand-side  variables excluding xln. As the sample size increases, and provided 
that the function A*)  is continuous, the distance between any two successive 
values decreases at rate n-' so that, in the limit, the influence of xln is purged 
from the regression  as if it were a (local) fixed effect. The advantage of this 
procedure-apart  from its elegance and simplicity-is  that we do not have to 
specify any functional form. The disadvantage is that we do not obtain an esti- 
mate of the slope of the Engel curve, something that is of no importance when 
our aim is to find the sign of PI,  the coefficient on family size, but that would 
become necessary if we ever got as far as calculating the compensation as in 
figure 6.5. 
The three sets of results are presented in table 6.8. In the event, getting the 
shape of the Engel curve right has little effect on the other coefficients, and in 
Table 6.8  Food Share Regressions Using Three Alternative Techniques 
Estes and Honor6 
Nonparametric 
Variable  Linear Form  Fourier Flexible Form  Form 
In xln 




















-7.25  (39.3) 
-0.71  (2.9) 




-9.22  (9.1) 
-2.73  (2.7) 
1.14(1.0) 




-1.73  (1.4) 
-3.90  (2.3) 
6.80 (2.5) 
6.97 (1.8) 
~  1.38 (0.5) 
-1.42  (1.4) 
-  1.08 (1  .O) 
1.01 (2.2) 
-0.67  (2.7) 
-7.48  (7.6) 




-9.41  (9.2) 
-2.70  (2.8) 
0.90 (0.8) 




-1.62  (1.3) 
-3.93  (2.3) 
5.27 (2.0) 
5.31 (1.4) 
-2.15  (0.7) 
-1.31  (1.3) 
1.61 (2.0) 
b  b 
-0.95  (4.6) 
-7.58  (7.8) 





-0.99  (2.7) 
10.14  (4.6) 
5.14 (2.3) 
-0.80  (0.3) 
-1.08(1.3) 




-1.53  (1.9) 
1.03 (1.7) 
2.21 (2.1) 
-9.54  (9.5) 
Notes; All coefficients multiplied by  100. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of f-statis- 
tics. For the first two columns, the standard errors on which the f-statistics are based have been 
corrected for random household effects. (Recall that the CEX has a panel element, and a single 
household may contribute up to four observations.)  The Estes and Honor6 standard errors have not 
been corrected for the first-differencing or for household random effects. 
"Estimated by  Fourier flexible form and coefficients not shown. 
bEstimated as a local fixed effect and eliminated from the regression. 198  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
all three specifications, the budget share of food is reduced by between a full 
point and two-thirds of a point in response to a unit increase in the logarithm 
of family size. This is not a large effect, but the negative sign is statistically 
significant, and once again we have the reverse of what would be predicted by 
our description of economies of scale. The other coefficients in table 6.8 are 
of  some  independent  interest.  Controlling  for  per  capita  outlay,  children, 
whether boys or girls, reduce per capita food consumption,  and men spend 
more on food than do women. The poverty dummy has strong positive interac- 
tions with the presence of  children under the age of  12, presumably through 
the operation of food stamps and AFDC. 
We have no good explanation for the failure of food to behave like a private 
good. Perhaps there are substantial economies of  scale associated with food, 
or perhaps increases in family size cause more substitution than seems plausi- 
ble from food toward housing and other public goods. Whatever the story, the 
conclusion that a negative discount understates the true discount to family size, 
although hard to challenge, is not very useful. We therefore turn to other goods 
as potential private goods, although we confess that our confidence in the gen- 
eral methodology is somewhat shaken by  the failure of  the most promising 
good to yield useful results. 
As for food, we estimate equation (19) for a range of goods from the CEX. 
We calculate the change in the logarithm of per capita total outlay that keeps 
per capita expenditure constant in the face of a change in household size with 
household composition held constant. This is done through the per capita ex- 
penditure-constant elasticity, from equation (19): 
dlnxln  -  -  PI 
dlnn  w  + f’(lnx/n) ’ 
which is evaluated at the sample means. 
The results, in table 6.9, are given for a list of commodity groups that sums 
to total outlay, and they are almost as bewildering as those for food. Of course, 
Table 6.9  Family Size Percentage Discounts for Various Items of Expenditure 
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goods like transportation and housing and utilities are certainly not private 
goods, and it is no surprise to find that expenditure per capita on housing falls 
with family size. But commodities like alcohol and tobacco, which might seem 
to be candidates for private goods, have less spent on them as family size in- 
creases. Perhaps these are examples of negative public goods, which generate 
negative externalities for other members of  the family, and which therefore 
become more expensive as family size increases. Transportation and medical 
expenditures-the  latter  strongly  associated with  the  elderly  in  the  esti- 
mates-are  items for which expenditure increases with family size. The for- 
mer would appear to have  a public element, in which case its expenditure 
would be expected to decrease, while it is hard to see why family size should 
increase medical expenditures when the age composition of the household is 
being controlled for. There is perhaps some consolation in the estimates for 
clothing, personal care, and educational expenditures. If  we use these, and ig- 
nore the anomalous results elsewhere, we obtain modest economies of scale, 
with the elasticity of needs to size between 85 and 95 percent. But it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that expenditure patterns respond to family size in ways 
that are a good deal more complex than the simple story of public and private 
goods that we have considered in this paper. Constructing better models of this 
process remains a challenge for the future. 
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COmment  B. Douglas Bernheim 
This provocative and ambitious paper wrestles with the difficult problem of 
measuring poverty consistently across diverse groups of individuals. The paper 
is divided into two parts. The first part describes current practices regarding the 
measurement of poverty in the United States, and it examines the sensitivity of 
official poverty measures to alternative assumptions about the size of  appro- 
priate adjustments for differences in household composition. The second part 
outlines and implements a potentially superior methodology for establishing 
the size of these adjustments. 
Section 6.2 focuses on three specific household composition adjustments 
that are imbedded in  existing poverty thresholds. These adjustments are in- 
tended to account for family size, the presence of children, and the presence 
of  elderly households. The paper effectively makes the case that the official 
methods of making these adjustments are arbitrary, and moreover that the mea- 
surement of relative rates of poverty among different population subgroups is 
quite sensitive to plausible changes in the magnitudes of the adjustments. 
The analysis in this part of the paper is, without question, very useful. Still, 
it should hardly come as a surprise that there is inherent arbitrariness attached 
to the use of a single summary statistic for income distribution, such as a pov- 
B. Douglas Bemheim is the Lewis and Virginia Eaton Professor of Economics at Stanford Uni- 
versity and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 201  Measuring Poverty among the Elderly 
erty rate (the authors’ idea of  looking for stochastic dominance relations be- 
tween income distributions for different population subgroups therefore strikes 
me as particularly good). One is left at the end of  this paper wondering why 
economists should be engaged in the possibly futile exercise of trying to define 
meaningful poverty thresholds in the first place. I suspect that we have focused 
on poverty rates primarily to satisfy the demands of politicians and the press, 
who generally seem to limit their attention to single numbers. To the extent 
that economists wish to affect the policy process, it may be necessary to cater 
to the demand for oversimplification; thus, one justifies the exercise in this 
paper by arguing that, if politicians insist on using a single number, we should 
make sure that it is the best number possible. But then the ultimate point of 
this paper seems to be that the construction of a truly “good” poverty number 
is impossible. 
That said, it should be emphasized that there may well be some conceptually 
legitimate applications of poverty statistics. Although it may be very difficult, 
and possibly even meaningless, to compare rates of poverty across population 
subgroups, it may be justifiable to make comparisons across time for the same 
subgroup. That is, by  comparing poverty rates for the elderly in, say, 1990 and 
1965 using some constant-real-dollar poverty threshold, one may  be able to 
learn something important about changes in the lower tail of the income distri- 
bution, even if the absolute level of the threshold is inherently arbitrary. 
In section 6.3, the authors attempt to develop and implement a methodology 
for improving two of the household composition adjustments: family size and 
presence of children. The adjustment for the presence of elderly individuals is 
conspicuously absent from this list, which is unfortunate; one would expect 
the measurement of  poverty among the elderly (the focus of the paper) to be 
most sensitive to the elderly adjustment. 
This portion of the paper does an extremely thorough job of criticizing itself. 
The authors have already acknowledged, in some form, most (if not all) of the 
problems with their approach. My critique differs from the authors’ own cri- 
tique more in emphasis than in substance. 
As the authors note, there are two problems associated with moving from 
family resources to individual measures of welfare. The first problem concerns 
the intrahousehold allocation of resources. The second problem concerns the 
effects of household size and age structure on the standard of living. The au- 
thors write, somewhat euphemistically, that they “have little to say” about the 
first problem. Yet  is difficult for me to see how one can come up with a coher- 
ent resolution to the second problem without resolving the first one. 
Consider in particular the authors’ method of determining the appropriate 
poverty line adjustment for children. This involves partitioning consumption 
into “adult goods” and other goods, on the premise that children do not con- 
sume adult goods. But this premise inherently raises the issue of distribution. 
The underlying hypothesis is simply inconsistent with the view that resources 
are divided equally within the household. The authors have tried to finesse this 202  Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson 
problem linguistically, by assuming that resources are distributed “equitably,” 
rather than “equally,” among household members. But the meaning of “equita- 
bly” in this context is unclear, since equity necessarily involves the comparison 
of unequal consumption bundles across consumers with presumptively differ- 
ent preferences. 
Even if  one could articulate a notion of  equity that would correspond to 
equality of standard of living across heterogeneous family members, it is dif- 
ficult to see why this notion would be held forth as a positive theory of house- 
hold behavior, rather than as a normative standard. If the authors proceed on 
the basis of the assumption that intrahousehold allocation is governed by  (as 
yet unspecified) egalitarian principles, while in fact resources are distributed 
unequally within households, then it is highly unlikely that their methodology 
will yield appropriate adjustment factors. 
Consider the following example. Suppose that all household decisions are 
made by  a completely selfish, dictatorial head. The head consumes all of the 
households resources and instructs other family members to beg on the street 
for sustenance. In that case, it would appear to me that Deaton and Paxson 
would estimate (Y = 0. However, it seems incorrect to conclude from this find- 
ing that policymakers should regard children as costless. Alternatively, imagine 
that the dictatorial head is not completely selfish but cares less about each 
member that is added to the family. In that case, Deaton and Paxson would 
significantly overestimate the true extent of economies to scale. 
These examples make it clear that, for most positive theories of household 
behavior, it is not going to be possible to define a single poverty threshold for 
the entire household. It makes more sense to define a separate poverty level for 
each household member, where this threshold is chosen to represent the level 
of household income at which that member would achieve some measure of 
subsistence. Thus, in the first example above, there would be some finite pov- 
erty threshold for the head, and the formula for this threshold would indeed 
involve (Y = 0,  but the poverty thresholds for other household members would 
be infinite (since no amount of household income would bring them to subsis- 
tence). In the second example, the poverty threshold for the head would rise at 
a declining rate with the number of  household members. However, for any 
given household composition, younger children would have higher thresholds 
than older children, and the head would have the lowest threshold of all. 
These examples also make the general point that the authors’ methodology 
is likely to produce little more than a measure of the preferences of the house- 
hold decision maker. To drive this point home, consider the following whimsi- 
cal suggestion: why not adjust the poverty line for the presence of household 
pets? This is potentially important in the context of aging, since the elderly are 
probably significantly more likely to be in pet-less households, and therefore 
less likely to have  to share household resources with pets. How  would one 
calculate the  appropriate adjustment? Following  Deaton  and  Paxson’s  ap- 
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(including nonhuman goods). This might, of course, prove difficult in practice, 
since household pets do consume many human goods (“people food”  being 
the leading example). Abstracting from this problem, one could then determine 
the levels of household income that would equate spending on human goods 
between households with pets and pet-less households. One would then use 
this to set an adjustment factor for pets, analogous to a.  Thus, the poverty 
threshold would be higher for households with pets. 
I would, however, question the appropriateness of the pet adjustment. First, 
the  ownership of  pets  is voluntary. The human  members  of  the  household 
would not have acquired a pet unless they thought that they would be better 
off as a result  of owning the pet.  Consequently,  there is no reason to set a 
higher poverty threshold for the humans merely because they choose to own a 
pet. Second, with respect to the welfare of the pet (rather than the welfare of 
the  humans),  the  division  of  expenditures  between  human  and  nonhuman 
goods is likely to tell us more about the humans’ willingness to spend money 
on the pet than about the costs of maintaining a pet at subsistence. 
These observations are not completely whimsical. Children are, at least to 
some extent, voluntary choices. Thus, if one were properly defining poverty 
thresholds for individuals, rather than for households, it is not at all obvious 
that it would be appropriate to increase the poverty threshold for parents based 
on number of children. With respect to poverty thresholds for children, the 
Deaton-Paxson  method might measure some aspect of parents’ willingness to 
spend money on children, but it probably does not tell us much about the wel- 
fare of children. 
Generally, it seems to me that the Deaton-Paxson estimates teach us about 
preferences, rather than about subsistence standards. Consider again the strat- 
egy of differentiating between adult goods and other goods. Even if children 
do not consume adult goods, their presence may affect (or be correlated with) 
the preferences of adult household members. For example, adults may prefer 
to engage in fewer activities involving the consumption of alcohol after having 
children; alternatively, children may drive their parents to drink. People who 
have children may simply have different tastes than those without children. If 
different adult goods have different income expansion paths, then the method- 
ology may simply identify, in a convoluted way, the income elasticities of the 
adult goods that have been selected for the analysis. 
I am also skeptical about the kinds of comparisons that the authors make in 
their attempt to identify household economies of scale, and I am less surprised 
by their “puzzling” results concerning food. I agree that food is, almost cer- 
tainly, a private good. However, the preparation and storage of food are public 
goods. Economies of scale in preparation and storage may induce smaller fam- 
ilies to eat out more often, raising the cost per meal and giving rise to apparent 
economies of scale in food consumption. Alternatively, the taste for eating at 
home may change when  family size grows,  as the  social aspects of  family 
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As I have emphasized, the authors are acutely aware of  the limitations of 
their methodology. The great challenge here is to come up with a better ap- 
proach. Although I have failed to rise to this challenge, I have two suggestions. 
First, it might be possible to design a less arbitrary poverty line if the pur- 
pose of the poverty line were more clearly defined. One could, for example, 
decide to define the poverty line in terms of the adequacy of nutrition. In that 
case, meaningful poverty thresholds could be constructed as follows. First, set 
standards of adequacy for nutritional outcomes. Second, collect data on nutri- 
tional outcomes, income, and household characteristics. Third, relate nutri- 
tional outcomes to income and household characteristics separately for each 
household position (husband, wife, first male child, first female child, elderly 
parent, etc.). This would allow one to determine, for each household position, 
the level of  household income necessary to assure nutritional adequacy with 
some prespecified level of probability. 
Second, instead of comparing consumption across different households in 
cross sections, one might compare consumption for the same household across 
time, as household composition changes. The life cycle hypothesis, in effect, 
argues that households should smooth their standards of living through time. 
Thus, one could examine changes in consumption associated with household 
additions to determine the amount of resources required to compensate for an 
addition. One could also examine the manner in which consumption responds 
to departures from households. This has some advantages, since certain depar- 
tures (e.g., of  grown children) are usually  anticipated. Life insurance pur- 
chases, which anticipate departures, can also be used to infer household econo- 
mies of scale. 
While this approach has some attractive conceptual features, it also presents 
some new problems. First, one must subscribe rather unreservedly to the hy- 
pothesis of rational intertemporal optimization. Second, the applicability of the 
method to lower income households may be limited, to the extent that these 
households are liquidity constrained. The possibility of binding liquidity con- 
straints suggests a somewhat more ad hoc approach: measure the level of in- 
come at which the typical household begins to save, and examine how  this 
varies with household composition. 